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ORIGINS OF LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY

Дана стаття присвячена одній із дискусійних проблем філософії – проблеми виникнення та існування аналітичної філософії, точніше одному з її напрямків, лінгвістичної філософії. Автори представили короткий аналіз історії виникнення лінгвістичної філософії. Розкриваються дискусійність і інноваційність поглядів видатних філософів на необхідність існування лінгвістичної філософії, її цілей, завдань, методів. Проведено аналіз праць філософів-аналітиків на предмет генезису лінгвістичної філософії. Аналіз спирався як на першоджерела, так і на наступні дослідження. Вивчення матеріалів показує, що в рамках даного напрямку сучасної філософії існує велика кількість спірних питань. Отримані результати свідчать про те, що проблема необхідності існування лінгвістичної філософії вимагає подальших досліджень і більш глибокого вивчення.

Ключові слова: аналітична філософія; генезис; лінгвістичний поворот; лінгвістична філософія; філософи-аналітики

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Данная статья посвящена одной из дискуссионных проблем философии – проблеме возникновения и существования аналитической философии, точнее одному из ее направлений, лингвистической философии. Авторы представили краткий анализ истории возникновения лингвистической философии. Раскрываются дискуссионность и инновационность взглядов выдающихся философов на необходимость существования лингвистической философии, ее целей, задач, методов. Проведен анализ трудов философов-аналитиков на предмет генезиса лингвистической философии. Анализ опирался как на первоисточники, так и на данные последующих исследований. Изучение материалов показывает, что в рамках данного направления современной философии существует большое количество спорных вопросов. Полученные результаты свидетельствуют о том, что проблема необходимости

существования лингвистической философии требует дальнейших исследований и более глубокого изучения.

Ключевые слова: *аналитическая философия; генезис; лингвистический поворот; лингвистическая философия; философы-аналитики*

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The article is devoted to one of the debatable problems of philosophy – the problem of the emergence and existence of analytic philosophy, more precisely, one of its directions, linguistic philosophy. The authors represent a brief analysis of the history of the origin of linguistic philosophy. The debatable and innovative views of the outstanding philosophers on the necessity for the existence of linguistic philosophy, its goals, tasks, methods are disclosed. The works of the philosophers-analysts on the genesis of linguistic philosophy are analysed. The analysis has been based both on the primary sources, and on the data of the subsequent studies. Studying the materials shows that in the current direction of modern philosophy there are a large number of contentious issues. The paper also makes an attempt to reveal the origin and background of the term “linguistic turn”. The problem is very important for disclosing the essence of linguistic philosophy. The obtained results indicate that the problem of the necessity of the existence of linguistic philosophy requires further research and deeper studying. linguistic philosophy has been characterized by the desire to enrich the analytical philosophical methodological apparatus by developing a theory of meaning and referring to other philosophical traditions (historical, hermeneutical). As linguistic and analytic philosophies are increasingly conscious of the inseparability of analytical and linguistic philosophical thinking, not only from its origins, but also from the traditions of continental European philosophy and linguistics. Nowadays it is necessary to talk about a new, unifying, “converging” philosophy, the key issues of which are the problems of man and his role in cognition and activity, the importance of intensional concepts within the framework of modern language theory, the role of the language community in cognition.

Key words: *analytic philosophy; genesis; linguistic turn; linguistic philosophy; philosophers-analysts*

Introduction. One of the distinctive features of intellectual philosophical and linguistic culture of the 20th century is development and growing influence of analytic philosophy. Its history chronologically coincides with the history of the 20th century. The general characteristics of this direction in philosophy is detailed studying language (taking into account the latest achievements of logic and linguistics) with the aim of solving philosophical problems. The main goals of philosophy of analysis are identifying the structure of thought, clarifying everything vague, indistinct, achieving a

“transparent” correlation of language and reality, delineating clearly sensible and empty expressions, meaningful and meaningless phrases. Within analytic philosophy, two directions are distinguished: philosophy of logical analysis and the philosophy of linguistic analysis (or *linguistic philosophy*).

The followers of the first direction are mostly interested in philosophy and logic of science. The proponents of the second direction consider this orientation to be artificial and too narrow, excessively limiting the philosophical horizon. If the first direction is considered more or less developed, the second one is only in the stage of developing. That is why studying the origins and logic of linguistic philosophy can be considered a contribution to the analysis of the intellectual history of the 20th century. At the same time, it is a strong, dynamically developing tradition of thought, showing its ability to transformation and self-correction. In this sense, the analysis of the changes taking place and the comprehension of the origins and prospects of linguistic philosophy are **relevant and useful**.

Purpose of the article. The purpose of the article is to investigate and analyse thoroughly the origins of linguistic philosophy. The purpose stated determines **the objectives** of the article: a) to present the reconstruction of the picture of genesis of linguistic philosophy; b) to study the processes which have taken place within it; c) to study the interrelation of linguistic philosophy with the other philosophic and linguistic directions of the 20th century.

Scientific novelty. On the basis of studying the works of philosophers-analysts and Western historical and philosophical literature, the definition of the terms “analytic philosophy” and “linguistic philosophy” has been obtained. The former is an independent branch of philosophical knowledge, in which methods of logical and linguistic analysis of studying language as a system of symbols, which expresses its subject-matter significance in the process of the relationship between man and the world and the analysis of this language shows the philosophical problems fixed by it and the ways of their solution. The latter is considered as one of the trends of analytic philosophy by some scientists. The other scientists and scholars consider linguistic philosophy as an independent science which goals, methods and objectives coincide with the same ones of analytic philosophy.

Statement of the main material. As it has been mentioned, linguistic philosophy is one of the directions of analytic philosophy. So it is appropriate to present some information of such a trend in philosophy as analytic philosophy.

Analytic philosophy originates in the works of Gottlob Frege (1848 – 1925), Bertrand Russell (1872 – 1970), G. E. Moore (1873 – 1958), and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 – 1951). There are two main strands in early analytic philosophy: 1) Frege’s analysis of number statements and Russell’s theory of descriptions; 2) Moore’s concern with analysing ethics and epistemology. Let us consider these scientists’ viewpoints in detail.

The initial problems and concepts of analytic philosophy were formulated in G. Frege’s article “On Sense and Reference” (1892) (Frege, 1892, p. 25 – 50). He introduced his influential distinction between *sense* (“Sinn”) and *reference* (“Bedeutung”, which has also been translated as “meaning”, or “denotation”). While

conventional accounts of meaning took expressions to have just one feature (reference), Frege introduced the view that expressions have two different aspects of significance: their sense and their reference. *Reference*, (or, “Bedeutung”) applied to proper names, where a given expression (e.g. *Tom*) simply refers to the entity bearing the name (the person named *Tom*). Frege also held that propositions had a referential relationship with their truth-value (in other words, a statement “refers” to the truth-value it takes). By contrast, the *sense* (or, “Sinn”) associated with a complete sentence is the thought it expresses. The sense of an expression is said to be the “mode of presentation” of the item referred to, and there can be multiple modes of representation for the same referent. These distinctions were disputed by Bertrand Russell, especially in his paper “On Denoting” (Russel, 1905, p. 479 – 493); the controversy has continued into the present, fuelled especially by Saul Kripke’s famous lectures “Naming and Necessity” (Kripke, 1980).

George Edward Moore and Bertrand Russell started to develop analytic philosophy. Both philosophers paid great attention to the conventional problems of the theory of cognition in the spirit of realism: acceptance of the independence of the object of knowledge from its perception, the fact – from the judgment of it. Russell’s attention focused on the analytical possibilities of symbolic logic and the study of the foundations of mathematics. He proceeded from the works of G. Frege. G. Moore, however, took an analysis of philosophical concepts and problems by means of ordinary language and common sense.

L. Wittgenstein synthesized these two strands in the “Tractatus” (1921). In short, according to Frege’s and Russell’s conception analysis is rephrasing the problematic statements into correct logic forms. As to Moore’s theory, it can be considered as decomposition of complex concepts into their constituent parts or concepts, the so-called clarification – “the more clearly distinct the questions are distinguished, the better is our chance of answering [them] correctly” (Moore, 1903; p. 27). His later work is devoted to paying detailed attention to the subtle distinctions of ordinary language in order to solve some philosophical puzzles (Moore, 1959, chapter 7).

Concerning L. Wittgenstein’s ideas, in particular in his “Tractatus” (1921) (Wittgenstein, 1921), he shares Moore’s view that ordinary language is organised in perfect logical order and it does not need any “correcting”. The aim of analysis is to uncover the necessary presuppositions of our using and understanding ordinary language. On Wittgenstein’s view, the logic of our language requires the necessary existence of simple objects, but later he rejects this view.

During the 1930s, however, metaphysical analysis began to be much criticised, the ideas of logic atomism were thought unsupportable. At that time L. Wittgenstein gave up Frege’s idea on the logic of ordinary language, but he went on exploring the logic or the grammar of our concepts. The 1930s is the period of heated discussion of the supporters of Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s approaches to language, the supporters of philosophy of logic analysis and linguistic philosophy. During the 1930s – 1970s the analysts were gradually giving up epistemological realism and moving to the position of linguistic idealism. During this period a whole generation of philosophers, particularly those dominant in Oxford (Gilbert Ryle (1900 – 1976), J. L. Austin (1911 –

1960), Paul Grice (1913 – 1988), R. M. Hare (1919 – 2002), and Peter Strawson (1919 – 2006)), the USA and some other European countries appeared.

Nevertheless, G. Moore's doctrine, the theories by G' Frege and Bertrand Russell became the sources for the supporters and developers of linguistic philosophy. But the most important source for linguistic philosophy is L. Wittgenstein's late viewpoints, in particular his theory of linguistic meaning "as using". These ideas caused the further development of linguistic philosophy. Its disciplinary formation is connected with the ideas by J. Wisdom, later J. L. Austin and G. Ryle denying formalism in philosophy appeal to the analysis of the meanings of everyday language. The slogan of this trend is language is a social phenomenon. The meaning is this or that means of using the word in the definite context. In contrast to philosophy of logical analysis, the representatives of linguistic philosophy found the reason for emerging the philosophical fallacies not in the conscious use of inaccuracies and ambiguous forms of language by "metaphysicists", but in the very "logic" of language, in its "deep grammar", which generates paradoxical sentences (such as the sentence, which G. Moore drew attention to, "It is raining, but I do not believe it") and all the sorts of linguistic "traps". According to Wittgenstein and some of his followers from the University of Cambridge, philosophical misconceptions are eliminated by clarifying and describing in detail the natural ways in which words and expressions are used, the including words in the contexts of human communication (the so-called "language games") that are organically inherent to them, introducing the requirement that any used word assumes the possibility of its antithesis and other devices. At the same time, in contrast to the logical positivists, the supporters of linguistic philosophy do not appeal for "perfection" of the natural language on the model of the formalised logical languages or languages of science. One of the schools of linguistic philosophy (J. Wisdom, M. Lazerowitz, E. Ambrose) developed a purely "therapeutic" interpretation of the goals and objectives of philosophy, drawing closer in this regard to psychoanalysis. Another group of the linguistic philosophers – the Oxford School of "ordinary language" (known also as "Oxford Philosophy") – sought first of all to create a positive concept of linguistic activity. It developed original ideas, introduced a new categorial apparatus for analysing the language communication (the theory of "speech acts" by J. L. Austin), for describing how to use psychological concepts (G. Ryle), for discovering the "conceptual scheme" of language and cognition (P. F. Strawson), for analysing moral expressions (R. M. Hare, (Hare, 1952)). Beginning from the 1960s there is a convergence of the range of problems and research approaches of linguistic philosophy and a number of trends in modern linguistics (primarily in the sphere of linguistic pragmatics).

Being one of the schools of neo-positivism, linguistic philosophy denies the philosophical nature of philosophy and takes into consideration the traditional philosophical problems. Unlike the adherents of other varieties of analytic philosophy, the representatives of linguistic philosophy see the task of the "philosopher-analyst" not to reform the language according to some logical norm, but in a detailed analysis of the actual consumption of natural spoken language in order to eliminate the misunderstandings that arise due to misuse of language. In particular, according to

linguistic philosophy, such an analysis leads to identifying the reasons for posing the philosophical problems as if they appeared to arise as a result of the unlawful expansion of everyday word usage. Denying any manifestations of technicalism in philosophy associated with using a special conceptual apparatus, and advocating the “purity” of the use of natural language, linguistic philosophy acts as a decisive opponent of scientism in philosophy, in particular the scientism of logical positivists.

Speaking of linguistic philosophy, it is necessary to mention the term “linguistic turn”. As V. A. Ladov points, “Of course, the term “analytic philosophy” is very broad, there is a great number of thematic and methodological “shades” in the studies of those thinkers who, somehow, are considered to be the followers of this tradition. And yet the common epistemological core is beyond doubt – it is a “linguistic turn” in philosophy, with which the “classics” of the analytic tradition are directly concerned: G. Frege, B. Russell, G. Moore, L. Wittgenstein. Aspiring to the same “lucidity and clarity” of the given, the philosopher-analyst, after the “linguistic turn”, asks no longer about the world in itself, but about what we mean when we talk about the world, that is, about the meaning and correctness of constructing our statements about the world” (Blinov & Ladov, 2004, p. 278).

It is difficult to detect the author of the term “linguistic turn”, but the book with such a title was issued in 1967, the chief editor of which was R. Rorty (Rorty, 1967). The introductory article in this collection presents the impressive comparison of other revolutions in philosophy with the “linguistic turn”. This trend insists on solving or eliminating all the philosophical problems either by the way of reforming the contemporary language (especially the language of science) or by the way of its understanding more adequately, removing confusion from it. Thus, on this basis, a number of researchers come to the conclusion that, unlike the logical analysis of language, the task of a philosopher-analyst from the point of view of linguistic philosophy is not to reform language in accordance with some logical norm, but in a detailed analysis of the actual use of natural ordinary language in order to eliminate misunderstandings arising from its misuse.

Surovtsev V. A. and Syrov V. N. write in their article, “Language Game and Role of Metaphor in Scientific Cognition” that “the essence is in the fact that the linguistic turn led to rewriting the concepts “language”, “text”, “discourse”, “plot”, etc. in the process of widening the sphere of their being applied.... If we use Nietzsche’s deep thought, the very formulation of the question of what the world really is appears a consequence of scepticism and relativism. At the heart of man’s ideas about himself and the world lie the fundamental temporal structure and goals of domination, use, satisfaction of desires. From this point of view, the linguistic turn and the corresponding practices of analytic philosophy, hermeneutics and deconstruction should be regarded as the extraction of the productive consequences from the human finiteness” (Surovtsev & Syrov, 1999). Thus, we can say that linguistic philosophy is a part of philosophy, and the linguistic turn is the turn not from philosophy, not aside of it but to it.

Conclusions. Making an attempt to present the origins of linguistic philosophy we have tried to analyse the most vivid and brightest works by the famous philosophers-

analysts. There are a lot of issues, ideas and problems left unsolved and continued to be discussed.

Linguistic philosophy is one of the largest schools in analytic philosophy. The issues and ideas touched upon by linguistic philosophy are of great importance and relevance nowadays. These issues and ideas are infinitely diverse in modern thought.

And the main problem, which needs investigating and analysing is the problem which makes even more interesting the idea of the reasons for its establishment and the trends in its development – the problem of the foundations of this philosophy, which in itself becomes possible only within the framework of such philosophy, for this is the problem of the problem – the problem of language. Concerning the perspectives of investigating the problems of linguistic philosophy, we can say that there are a lot of different interesting, ambiguous, provoking issues which are of great importance and interest for further research.

In recent years, linguistic philosophy has been characterized by the desire to enrich the analytical philosophical methodological apparatus by developing a theory of meaning and referring to other philosophical traditions (historical, hermeneutical). Linguistic and analytic philosophies are increasingly aware of the inseparability of analytical and linguistic philosophical thinking, not only from its origins, but also from the traditions of continental European philosophy and linguistics. In our opinion, today one needs to talk about a new, unifying, “converging” philosophy, the key issues of which are the problems of man and his role in cognition and activity, the importance of intensional concepts within the framework of modern language theory, the role of the language community in cognition, and so on.

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